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IN recent years thousands of defendants have pleaded nolo con-
tendere to indictments and criminal informations charging them with
violating the anti-trust laws.1 This phenomenon has served to focus
attention upon a little known plea of criminal procedure. It has also led
to criticism of the Department of Justice for not having insisted on
pleas of guilty in its criminal anti-trust prosecutions, especially in the
suits which had been brought against important companies in the rubber,
magnesium and other war industries. One leading newspaper has char-
acterized the pleas of nolo entered in the Standard Oil case2 as consent
decrees which left undetermined the guilt of the Standard Oil Company.
The general failure to understand the nature of the plea 3 is further
shown by diverse labels that have been used to describe it, - a quasi
confession of guilt,4 an implied confession,' a mild form of pleading
guilty,6 and a compromise between the defendant and the state." One law
school professor has even termed it "a gentleman's plea of guilty" in view
of its recent popular and widespread use. However, an examination of
the nature and implications of the plea reveals the error of these con-
ceptions and fully supports the Department's apparent position that the
nolo plea is equivalent to a plea of guilty.
The plea was known to the English common law as early as the reign
of Henry IV. The approved statement of its essential characteristics
* Mlember of the New York Bar, Attorney, Office of Alien Property Custodian.
4-Member of the New York Bar, Special Assistant to the Attorney General.
The opinions here expressed are solely those of the authors.
1. For example, between July 1, 1941, and June 30. 1942, 47 anti-trust cases involv-
ing over a thousand defendants, were terminated as a result of nolo contendere pleas and
over $1,500,000 were collected in fines.
2. N. Y. Times, April 2, 1942, p. 20, cols. 1-2, referring to United States v. Stan-
dard Oil Co. of New Jersey (Crim. Information, D. N. J., March 25, 1942).
3. E.g., in State v. Hopkins, 4 Boyce 306, 307, 89 Ad. 473, 474 (Del. Ct. Gen. Sess.
1913) the court stated that by a plea of non-vult contendere the accused "throws him-
self upon this court to say whether or not he is guily of an infraction of this law." In
view of the cases hereinafter cited this statement is patently in error.
4. State v. Burnett, 174 N. C. 796, 93 S. E. 473 (1917).
5. Commonwealth v. Horton, 26 Mass. 206, 207 (1829).
6. Buck v. Commonwealth, 107 Pa. 4S6, 4S9 (1884).
7. United States v. Glidden Co., 78 F. (2d) 639, 642 (C. C. A. 6th, 1935); Tucker
v. United States, 196 Fed. 260, 262 (C. C. A. 7th, 1912).
S. Hem IV (1399-1413); 11 Hen. IV 6521, cited in 2 HAwvIms, A TnEArisa or
THE PL.AS OF TEM CRowN (8th ed. 1824) 466.
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at common law is found in Hawkins, A Treatise of the Pleas Of The
Crown,0 the leading English authority:
"An implied confession is where a defendant, in a case not
capital, doth not directly own himself guilty, but in a manner
admits it by yielding to the King's mercy, and desiring to submit
to a small fine: in which case, if the court think fit to accept of
such submission, and make an entry that defendant posuit se in
gratiam regis, without putting him to a direct confession, or plea
(which in such cases seems to be left to discretion), the defendant
shall not be estopped to plead not guilty to an action for the same
fact, as he shall if the entry is quod cognovit indictainentum."
Thus, nolo contendere was not a plea in the accepted sense but more in
the nature of a petition to the sovereign's mercy. Although the plea or
petition developed as a part of the common law, it has in England fallen
into the discard, and since 1702 no instance of its entry has been found.10
In the United States, its continued use has not led to any radical altera-
tion of the accepted definition of the plea as stated by Hawkins,11 but,
as has been pointed out, misunderstandings concerning its use and conse-
quences persist.
Federal and state decisions are in agreement that the plea cannot be
entered by the defendant as a matter of right, and that its acceptance
by the court is entirely a matter of grace." As with other pleas, once
nolo contendere has been accepted, it is discretionary with the court
whether the plea may be withdrawn and replaced by another form of
pleading."3 In a comparatively recent case,' 4 the defendant attempted to
9. 2 HAWKINs, op. cit. supra note 8, at 466.
10. The lalt reported English case is The Queen v. Templeman, I Salk. 55 (Q. B.
1702).
11. The plea has been defined as "a formal declaration by the accused that he vilU
not contest the charge against him. It is an implied confession of guilt and, for tile pur-
poses of the case only, is equivalent to a plea of guilty. It is not open to the accused
in all cases, and is allowable only by leave of court . . . The difference between it and
a plea of guilty appears to be simply that, while the latter is a confession binding ac-
cused in other proceedings [i.e., defendant is estopped from denying his guilt], the former
has no effect beyond the particular case. It is an implied confession of guilt only, and
cannot be used against accused as an admission in any civil suit for the same act." 22
C. J. S., § 425, p. 658-659.
12. Hudson v. United States, 272 U. S. 451 (1926); Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure
Oil Co., 26 F. Supp. 366 (D. Minn. 1939); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
Inc., 23 F. Supp. 531 (W. D. Wis. 1938); United States v. Lair, 195 Fed. 47 (C. C. A.
8th, 1912); Commonwealth v. Horton, 26 Mass. 206 (1829); Commonwealth v. Ingersoll,
145 Mass. 381, 14 N. E. 449 (1888) ; Williams v. State, 130 Miss. 827, 94 So. 882 (1922) ;
State v. Martin, 92 N. J. L. 436, 106 AtI. 385 (Ct. Errors and App. 1919); MeNab v.
State, 42 Wyo. 396, 295 Pac. 278 (1931).
13. Commonwealth v. Marino, 254 Mass. 533, 150 N. E. 841 (1926); State v. Sid-
dall, 103 Me. 144, 68 At. 634 (1907); in re Lanni, 47 R. I. 158, 131 Atd. 52 (1925).
But cf. Fox v. State, 112 Fla. 104, 150 So. 228 (1933) (defendant interposed plea of nolo
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substitute a plea of not guilty for a plea of nolo contendere previously
filed. After a motion to withdraw the plea had been rejected, the defend-
ant sought to regain his freedom in a subsequent habeas corpus pro-
ceeding, on the theory that he had been denied a jury trial. But the
court held that "a jury trial was waived by making that plea. . . . Like
a plea of guilty, it may be withdrawn only if the court allows it."
In an ordinary case, the acceptance of a plea of nol contendere has
the same consequences as a plea of guilty. " ' Imposition of sentence fol-
lows as a matter of course,' and only testimony bearing on the issue
of punishment can be submitted to the court.17 One court has succinctly
described the ensuing procedure in this fashion:18
"The judgment follows as well the one plea [nolo contendere]
as the other [guilty] . . .It is not necessary that the court should
adjudge that the party was guilty for that follows by necessary
legal inference from the implied confession."
As a corollary to the above practice, when the plea has been accepted,
it is not within the province of the court to adjudge the defendant
guilty or not guilty.19 In one state case it was held to be reversible
error for a trial judge to accept the plea in part and then to hear
evidence, not to determine the extent of punishment, but to ascertain
the guilt or innocence of the defendant. The appellate court stated, as
the ground for its reversal of the trial court, that "evidence is heard
only to aid the judge in fixing sentence." 2'- And, as in the case of a
plea of guilty, the court, if convinced of the defendant's innocence, may
advise him to move to withdraw the plea of nolo contendere in favor
contendere without understanding the legal effect of the plea; denial by the trial court
of the defendant's motion to withdraw the plea held to be errur).
14. Farnsworth v. Zerbst, 97 F. (2d) 255 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938), rehcaring dcnicd, 93
F. (2d) 541 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938).
15. Pharr v. United States, 48 F. (2d) 767 (C. C. A. 6th, 1931); Crowley v. United
States, 113 F. (2d) 334 (C. C. A. 8th, 1940) ; United States v. Lair, 195 Fed. 47 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1912) ; Commonwealth v. Ingersoll, 145 Mass. 381, 14 N. E. 449 (18I2); Com-
monvealth v. Jackson, 248 Pa. 530, 94 AUt. 233 (1915); State v. Siddall, 103 Me. 144,
68 Atl. 634 (1907) ; Schad v. McNinch, 103 W. Va. 44, 136 S. E. 865 (1927) ; State v.
Suick, 195 Wis. 175, 217 N. W. 743 (1928).
16. Commonwealth v. Ingersoll, 145 Mass. 381, 14 N. E. 449 (18O ); Common-
wealth v. Holstine, 132 Pa. 357, 19 Atl. 273 (1890).
17. State v. Burnett, 174 N. C. 796, 93 S. E. 473 (1917).
18. Commonwealth v. Horton, 26 Mass. 206, 208 (1829).
19. Ferguson v. Reinhart, 125 Pa. Super. 154, 19U Atl. 153 11937) ; State v. Herlihy,
102 Me. 310, 66 AtI. 643 (1906).
20. Crowleyr v. United States, 113 F. (2d) 334, 338 (C. C. A. 8th, 1940); common-
wealth v. Rousch, 113 Pa. Super. 182, 172 At. 484 (1934). In Ruitman v. United States,
41 F. (2d) 519 (C. C. A. 7th, 1930), rendition of a judgment of guilty after a plea uf
nolo contendere was held to be at most superfluous, and not error even thuugh testimony
bearing on the the defendant's guilt w\as taken after the plea %%as entered.
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of one of not guilty.2' Further, the plea of nolo contendere, like the
demurrer, admits for the purposes of the case, all facts that are well
pleaded. 2
There are few reported cases in this country in which the acceptability
of a plea of nolo contendere has been litigated. Those that have been
decided, however, raise two important problems. The question most
frequently considered by court and counsel is whether a defendant can
be imprisoned after a plea of nolo contendere to an offense where
imprisonment is an alternative punishment; a collateral issue is whether
the plea can be accepted at all in a case where imprisonment is man-
datory, i.e., a felony case.
All courts, both state and federal, have held that, in the absence of
statute, the plea cannot be interposed *to an indictment for a capital
offense. This limitation stems from the statement of I-Iawkins limit-
ing the applicability of the plea to "cases not capital". A rationale for the
restriction has been found in the theory that, where extreme penalties are
to be imposed, the law should be particularly scrupulous to "throw about
the accused every reasonable protection." His guilt should be established
beyond all reasonable doubt, and "an implied confession of guilt cannot
rise to the degree of certainty which would make it the equivalent of
an express confession." ''
As to whether the plea may be invoked in felony cases, the courts
seem to be divided along three principal lines: some jurisdictions will
accept the nolo plea in felony cases ;25 others limit its applicability to
"light" misdemeanors and feel constrained to limit punishment to a
fine ;2' and still others will not accept the plea in felony cases, but will
21. Of course, it would be improper to adjudge the defendant not guilty. See Com-
monwealth v. Rousch, 113 Pa. Super. 182, 172 Ati. 484 (1934); Ferguson v. Reinhart,
125 Pa. Super. 154, 190 Atl. 153 (1937).
22. State v. O'Brien, 18 R. I. 105, 25 Atl. 910 (1892).
23. Hudson v. United States, 272 U. S. 451 (1926) ; Tucker v. United States, 196
Fed. 260 (C. C. A. 7th, 1912); Commonwealth v. Shrope, 264 Pa. 246, 107 Atl, 729
(1919) ; Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 44 Pa. Super. 626 (1910); Roach v. Commonwealth,
157 Va. 954, 162 S. E. 50 (1932) ; State v. Kiewel, 166 Minn. 302, 207 N. W. 646 (1926);
Williams v. State, 130 Miss. 827, 844, 94 So. 882, 884 (1922). But cf. State v, Martin,
92 N. J. L. 436, 106 Atl. 385 (Ct. Errors and App. 1919) (By statute the New Jersey
courts may accept a plea of nolo contendere to an indictment for first degree murder; if
accepted, the charge is automatically reduced to second degree murder, imprisonment
for life being the punishment specified).
24. Commonwealth v. Shrope, 264 Pa. 246, 250, 107 At. 729, 730 (1919).
25. See, e.g., the federal courts [Hudson v. United States, 272 U. S. 451 (1926));
Massachusetts (Stat. 1855, c. 215, § 35); New Jersey [State v. Martin, 92 N. J. L.
436, 106 At. 385 (Ct. Errors and App. 1919)]; Pennsylvania [Commonwealth v. Fer-
guson, 44 Pa. Super. 626 (1910)]; Rhode Island [In re Lanni, 47 R. I. 158, 131 Atl.
52 (1925)].
26. See, e.g., Virginia [Roach v. Commonwealth, 157 Va. 954, 162 S. E. 50 (1932)];
Minnesota [State v. Kiewel, 166 Minn. 302, 207 N. W. 646 (1926)]; Mississippi [Wil-
liams v. State, 130 Miss. 827, 94 So. 882 (1922)].
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impose prison sentences after the plea has been accepted in an action
charging an offense for which imprisonment is an alternative punish-
ment.
27
In the federal courts the issue of the availability of the plea was
squarely presented for the first time in Tucker v. United States,"5 where
the defendant had been indicted for violation of the Internal Revenue
Act. After a plea of nolo contendere, the defendant was sentenced to
prison and fined. On appeal, two questions were certified to the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit: first, whether acceptance of
a plea of nolo contendere precludes sentence of imprisonment; and,
second, whether a court may accept such a plea when the offense is
one for which imprisonment is mandatory. The first question vas
answered in the affirmative, the second in the negative. In the absence
of a federal rule regulating the plea, the Court rested its judgment upon
its interpretation of the common law. It concluded that the plea was
not applicable in those cases where imprisonment was mandatory, but
could be accepted where imprisonment was an alternative punishment,
and, if accepted in the latter case, the Court could only impose a fine.
Thus, basing its holding on Hawkins' statement of "desiring to submit
to a small fine," the Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that only a fine
could be imposed, and a fortiori if the offense were one where imprison-
ment was compulsory, the plea could not be accepted.
On the first point, the Tucker case was repudiated by the United States
Supreme Court in Hudson v. Uidted States.9 In the Hudson case, the
defendants were indicted for using the mails to defraud, a felony punish-
able by fine or imprisonment or both, and, after pleading nolo contendere.
each defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for a year and a day.
Again, as in the Tucker case, the question was raised "whether a United
States court, after accepting a plea of nolo contendere, may impose a
prison sentence?" The Supreme Court, replying in the affirmative, held
Hawkins' statement, "desiring to submit to a small fine", illustrative
only and not a condition binding on the tribunal. The Court declared:
"There is no suggestion that would warrant the conclusion that
a court, by the mere acceptance of the plea of nolo contendere,
would be limited to a fine in fixing sentence ...
"We think it dear, therefore, that the contention now pressed
upon us not only fails of support in judicial decisions, other than
those of the seventh circuit already noticed, but its historical back-
ground is too meager and inconclusive to be persuasive in leading
us to adopt the limitation as one recognized by the common law.
27. See, e.g., West Virginia [Schad v. McNinch, 103 W. Va. 44, 49, 136 S. - 865,
867 (1927)]; lVisconsin [Brozosky v. State, 197 Wis. 446, 451, 222 N. W. 311, 312
(1928)].
28. 196 Fed. 260 (C. C. A. 7th, 1912).
29. 272 U. S. 451, 456-457 (1926).
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"Undoubtedly a court may, in its discretion, mitigate the punish-
ment on a plea of nolo contendere and feel constrained to do so
whenever the plea is accepted with the understanding that only a
fine is to be imposed. But such a restriction made mandatory
upon the court by positive rule of law would only hamper its dis-
cretion and curtail the utility of the plea." 30
The Supreme Court did not expressly decide whether the plea is
permissible in cases where punishment by imprisonment is mandatory.
But on this point, too, the Tucker case was apparently overruled, since
it was stated that the "use of the plea" and "the propriety of imposing
a prison sentence upon it are recognized by the Probation Act,"1 which
provides for the suspension of sentence and the release of the prisoner
on probation . . . 'after a plea . . . of nolo contendere for any crime
or offense not punishable by death or life imprisonment.' "
While the decision in the Tucker case was followed in some juris-
dictions it was not the accepted rule, prior to the decision in the Hudson
case, in the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals. Thus, in United States
v. Lair,"3 the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit did not question
the acceptance of a plea of nolo contendere to an indictment charging
the importation of an alien prostitute, and affirmed the sentence of
two years and fine of $2,500. The rule enunciated in the Hudson case,
0 4
that prison sentences can be imposed after a nolo plea, has, since
that decision, been consistently followed in the federal courts. In
Crowley v. United States,3 the defendants were indicted for mail
fraud and sentenced to prison and fined after their plea of nolo con-
tendere. The Court said that "it is settled that the pleas of nolo con-
tendere were confessions of guilt for the purpose of the case, and
sentence of both imprisonment and fine could be imposed upon such
a plea."" 0  Similarly, in Farnsworth v. Sanford,3 7 the defendant, after
pleading nolo contendere to an espionage indictment, sought release
by a petition for habeas corpus, claiming that no valid plea of nolo
contendere could be made where the offense charged was punishable
by a mandatory penalty of imprisonment. But, relying on the Hudson
case, the Court rejected this contention. The established rule is further
30. Ibid.
31. 43 STAT. 1259 (1925), 18 U. S. C. § 724 (1940).
32. See cases cited supra note 27.
33. 195 Fed. 47 (C. C. A. 8th, 1912).
34. 9 HUGHES, FEDERAL PRAcncE (1941 Supp.) § 7089 thus states the rule: "Though
a plea of nolo contendere does not create an estoppel, it has all the effect of a plea of
guilty for the purposes of the particular case, so that any punishment, including inpris-
onment, may be imposed which would be permissible under a plea of guilty . .
35. 113 F. (2d) 334 (C. C. A. 8th, 1940).
36. Id. at 338.
37. 33 F. Supp. 400 (N. D. Ga. 1940).
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illustrated by a recent case,"s in which the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission charged a conspiracy to violate the anti-manipulative provisions
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. On a plea of nolo contendere
the defendants were given suspended prison sentences of two years and
fined $10,000.
The state courts are in hopeless disagreement on these issues.
Several jurisdictions take the extreme position that no recognition can
be accorded the plea of nolo contendere in any event. This is either
because there is no provision for the plea in the criminal statutes of the
state, and hence, by implication, it is not available to the defendant,-'
or because the plea has been outlawed by statute.40 In jurisdictions where
the plea is recognized, it is settled in Pennsylvania,41 New Jersey'-2 Rhode
Island, 3 and Massachusetts" that the plea can be interposed to a felony
indictment, and, thus, a prison sentence can be imposed after a plea of
nolo contendere. In West Virginia4" and Wisconsin,"0 it is not clear
whether the plea would be accepted if interposed to a felony indictment.
However, these jurisdictions have admitted the plea in cases involving
misdemeanors, and have imposed prison sentences where imprisonment is
an alternative mode of punishment. Other states will accept the plea only
for a misdemeanor and after its acceptance have limited the punishment
to a fine." The reason for this holding is, as stated by a Virginia court,
that since there is no statutory provision for the plea, the common law
must prevail:
38. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Release No. 3020, Sept. 25, 1941.
39. People v. Miller, 264 Ill. 148, 106 N. E. 191 (1914); State v. Niewel, 165 Minn.
302, 207 N. W. 646 (1926); Mahoney v. State, 197 Ind. 335, 149 N. E. 444 (1925);
State v. Hill, 145 Kan. 27, 64 P. (2d) 71 (1937). A contrary result is reached in
W ryoming, where it has been held that the common law recognition of the plea is not in-
consistent with the statute for criminal procedure that fails to make specific provision
for it. See McNab v. State, 42 VWyo. 396, 295 Pac. 278 (1931).
40. People v. Daiboch, 265 N. Y. 125, 191 N. E. 859 (1934). It is interesting to
note that even though New York has abolished the plea of nolo contendere it gives extra-
territorial effect to the plea. See note 61 in!ra.
41. Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 44 Pa. Super. 626 (1910); Teslovich Y. Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co. of San Francisco, 110 Pa. Super. 245, 168 Ati. 354 (1933); Common-
wealth v. Shrope, 264 Pa. 246, 107 At. 729 (1919).
42. State v. Martin, 92 N. J. L. 436, 106 Ad. 385 (Ct. Errors and App. 1919);
State v. Alderman, 81 N. J. L. 549, 79 At. 283 (Ct. Errors and App. 1911).
43. Barker v. Almy, 20 R. I. 367, 39 At. 185 (1898) ; Orabona v. Linscot, 49 L 1.
443, 144 At. 52 (1928) ; In re Lanni, 47 R. I. 158, 131 Ad. 52 (1925).
44. Commonwealth v. Horton, 26 Mass. 206 (1829); Commonwealth ,. Ingersoll,
145 Mass. 381, 14 N. E. 449 (1888); Commonwealth v. Adams, 72 Mass. 359 (1856);
Commonwealth v. Marino, 254 Mass. 533, 150 N. E. 841 (1926).
45. Schad v. McNinch, 103 IV. Va. 44, 136 S. E. 865 (1927).
46. Brozosky v. State, 197 Wis. 446, 222 N. W. 311 (1923).
47. Roach v. Commonwealth, 157 Va. 954, 960, 162 S. E. 50, 52 (1932); Williams
v. State, 130 Miss. 827, 94 So. 882 (1922).
19421 1261
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
"In Virginia there is no such distinction between 'capital cases'
and 'felonies', as exists in some jurisdictions or as existed at com-
mon law . . 'Such offenses as are punishable with death or
confinement in the penitentiary are felonies; all other offenses are
misdemeanors.' . . . Under the prevailing law in this state a plea
of volo contendere cannot be accepted in a felony case."
48
Disregarding for the moment the pronouncement of the various courts
on the question of whether a plea of nolo contendere can be interposed
to an indictment for a crime where a prison sentence is mandatory, and
using, as the courts have done, the statement of Hawkins as the rationale,
it does not seem illogical to argue that the plea should be applicable to
non-capital felony cases. Hawkins limits the applicability of the plea
to "cases not capital". This does not exclude all felonies where capital
punishment is prescribed. Parenthetically, the statement that defendant
"wishes to submit to a small fine" expresses only one of the reasons why
a defendant interposes the plea- it is only a hope and a desire on
the part of the defendant, certainly not binding on the court.40 As one
court has pointed out,8 0 there is an erroneous impression that under the
48. Roach v. Commonwealth, 157 Va. 954, 960, 162 S. E. 50, 52 (1932). Several
commentaries support this position by limiting the applicability of the plea to light
misdemeanors. See 2 BIsHOP, Nzav CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (2d ed. 1913) §802; ARCII-
BOLD'S PLEADING, EVIDENCE, AND PACTICE (26th ed. 1922) 379.
49. The state cases which limit the power of the Court to the imposition of a fine
fail to note that the recital in 2 HAwxxNs, op. cit. supra note 8, on which these decisions
have been predicated, is a petition for mercy-not a limitation upon the power of the
Court. See Brozosky v. State, 197 Wis. 451, 222 N. W. 311 (1928).
50. In United States v. Coppersmith, 4 Fed. 198, 201-203 (C. C. W. D. Tenn. 1880)
the following definition of "felony" is given: "The word 'felony' appears to have
been long used to signify the degree or class of crime committed, rather than the penal
consequences of the forfeiture occasioned by the crime according to its original signifi-
cation ...
"Capital punishment by no means enters into the true definition of felony. Strictly
speaking, the term comprised every species of crime which occasioned at common law
the total forfeiture either of lands or goods or both. That was the only test. Felonies
by common law are such as either concern the taking away of life, or concern the tak-
ing away of goods, or concern the habitation or concern the obstruction of the
execution of justice in criminal and capital causes, as escapes, rescues, etc. 1 Hale's
P. C. 411 . . . The superadded punishment was either capital or otherwise, according
to the degree of guilt; that is, the turpitude of the offense. There were felonies not pun-
ishable by death, and on the other hand there were offenses not felonies which were so
punishable. However, the idea of felony was so generally connected with capital punish-
ment, that, erroneously, it came to be understood that all crimes punishable with death
were felonies; and so, if a statute created a new offense and called it a felony, but pre-
scribed no punishment, by implication of law it was punishable with death . . . In
American law, forfeiture as a consequence of crime being generally abolished, the word
'felony' has lost its original and characteristic meaning, and it is rather used to denote
any high crime punishable by death or imprisonment . . ." See Considine v. United
States, 112 Fed. 342, 344 (C. C. A. 6th, 1901).
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common law all felonies are punishable by death, i.e., were capital crimes.
Many early statutes creating felonies did not prescribe punishment and
it is only by implication that these crimes were punishable by death.
Further, if the plea is accepted where imprisonment is an alternative
punishment and such punishment can be and is imposed, it is not in-
consistent to accept the plea where imprisonment is mandatory. In such
cases the defendant, by resorting to this plea rather than one of guilty,
is benefited by not being estopped to deny the facts in a subsequent civil
suit based on the same illegal activity. Thus, in Teslovich z,. Fireman's
Fund Insurance Company,' the plaintiff sued for damages resulting
from fire on property covered by the defendant insurance company. The
action was defended on the ground that in a prior action the plaintiff
had been indicted for arson and convicted under the plea of nolo. In
rejecting the "defendant's offer of proof of the entry of the plea to
establish that the fire was caused by the plaintiff in order to defraud
the insurance company, the Court held that the conviction under the plea
of nolo contendere could not be used against the plaintiff as an admis-
sion in any civil suit concerning the same act.
Thus, the only basic characteristic of the plea of nolo contendere which
differentiates it from a guilty plea is that the defendant is not estopped
from denying the facts to which he pleaded nolo contendere in a subse-
quent judicial civil proceeding." Apart from this immunity a number
of situations indicate that the consequences of the plea are not unlike
those of a plea of guilty.
In making pleas of nolo contendere defendants generally have hoped
to mitigate their punishment and undoubtedly have believed, or have
been advised, that their obligation to society would be settled by means
of this process. A persuasive factor, also, is the knowledge that the plea
does not estop the defendant from denying the facts in a subsequent
civil action growing out of the same alleged misdeed. MNforeover, the
expense of defending a long criminal prosecution and the stigma attached
to a guilty plea or conviction after trial can be avoided. But examina-
51. Teslovich v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. of San Francisco, 110 Pa. Super. 245, 163
AUt. 354 (1933).
52. In 4 Co"nrxs, A DIGEST OF THE LAws OF ENGLAND (4th ed. 1793), under Indict-
ment, c. K, Confession, p. 388, it is stated: "So, a man may ponere .r in graliam regis,
and pray that he may be admitted by fine. 9 H. 6. 60 a. And such a confession
does not conclude him. 9 H. 6, 60 a." See People ex rel. Attorney General v. Edi-
son, 100 Colo. 574, 577, 69 P. (2d) 246, 248 (1937) (Here a prior plea of nolo
contendere to a charge of perjury v.as not admitted against the defendant in a
subsequent disbarment proceeding. The court held: "The plea of nolo contendere en-
tered in the forum of the indictment, while effective for sentence there, w-as not other-
wise or elsewhere conclusive."); Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 26 F. Supp. 306,
376 (D. Minn. 1939) ; Fidelity-Phoenix Fire Ins. Co. of New York v. Murphy, 231 Ala.
6S0, 686, 166 So. 604, 609 (1936); Teslovich v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. of San Fran-
cisco, 110 Pa. Super. 245, 250, 163 Atl. 354, 355 (1933); 2 HAwvtns, op. d. supra
note 8, bk. 2, c. 31.
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tion of the legal implications of the plea demonstrates that the plea can
have disturbing consequences.
The adjudicated cases suggest several questions: What is the effect
of a prior plea of nolo contendere on the status of one convicted for
another crime in a jurisdiction providing for increased penalties for
multi-offenders? Can a nolo contendere plea be introduced to impeach
a witness' credibility in a subsequent action? What is the effect in a
state criminal anti-trust action of a plea of nolo to a federal anti-trust
indictment? And does a previous plea of nolo contendere amount to
a conviction under the numerous forms of questionnaires which are
required of the average individual, - "Have you ever been convicted of
a crime?"
It is clear that the entry of a plea of nolo contendere constitutes a
conviction making an individual, after a subsequent convittion, a multi-
offender. This proposition was established in People v. Daiboch'3 where
the defendant had pleaded guilty to an indictment for forgery and was
sentenced to the state penitentiary. Later it was discovered that
he had previously pleaded nolo to a felony charge in another jurisdiction
and he was re-sentenced as a second offender. The Appellate Division
of the State of New York decided that, since the defendant had been
convicted under a plea of nolo contendere, he was not a second offender
within the meaning of the applicable statute. In reversing the inter-
mediate court, the New York Court of Appeals stated that a nolo con-
tendere plea is a conviction and makes a person, after a second convic-
tion, a second offender.5 4 To the same effect is State v. Suick." There
the defendant pleaded nolo to violating the state liquor law, and later
pleaded guilty to another similar offense. The Court rejected the de-
fendant's contention, that the first judgment did not amount to a prior
conviction, in these words:
"The effect of this judgment between the parties depends in no
manner upon the proceedings which lead up to the rendition of
the judgment. The force and effect of the judgment is just the
same whether the defendant pleaded guilty, was found guilty by
a verdict of a jury, or whether judgment followed a plea of nolo
contendere. . . . It is a plea, however, from which a judgment of
conviction follows as inevitably as such judgment follows a plea
of guilty."
United States ex rel. Bruno v. Reimer, Commissioner of Immigration,0
indicates that federal courts will treat a nolo contendere plea as a convic-
53. 265 N. Y. 125, 129, 191 N. E. 859, 860 (1934).
54. Contra: People v. Miller, 264 I1. 148, 154, 106 N. E. 191, 194 (1914).
55. 195 Wis. 175, 177, 217 N. W. 743, 744 (1928). To the same effect is Brozosky
v. State, 197 Wis. 446, 451, 222 N. W. 311, 312 (1928).
56. 98 F. (2d) 92 _(C. C. A. 2d, 1938). See also Gemignani v. United States, 9 F.
(2d) 384 (C. C. A. 6th, 1925).
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tion in a situation similar to that in the Daiboch case. In the Rcincr
case, the defendant had been indicted for robbery in New Jersey and
under a plea of nolo contendere was sentenced to a reformatory. Sub-
sequently, he was indicted for robbery and pleaded guilty. While serving
the sentence given him in the second action, a deportation warrant was
issued on the ground that the defendant had been twice sentenced to serve
more than a year for crimes involving moral turpitude. On appeal from
the deportation order, the defendant asserted that the first sentence, not
being upon a plea of guilty, was not a sentence of conviction within the
meaning of the deportation statute. The defendant also argued that his
nolo plea admitted the truth of the facts charged in the indictment solely
for the purpose of the prosecution and, therefore, should not be con-
sidered in the deportation proceeding, a collateral matter. Both of these
contentions were overruled by the Court, which said:
"It is true that the plea is not treated as a confession, which can
be used against the accused elsewhere; but it gives the judge as
complete power to sentence as a plea of guilty . .. And it is
as conclusive of guilt for all purposes of prosecution under the
indictment., . Moreover, a sentence upon it is a conviction
within the terms of a local statute applying to second offenders"
(citing the Daiboch case).
The conclusion is, therefore, inescapable that a plea of nolo contendere
not only has the same force and effect as a conviction under a plea of
guilty insofar as it constitutes a conviction making the accused a second
offender, but also subjects the accused to all the penalties of being a
multiple offender where all convictions resulted from pleas of nolo con-
tendere.
A previous conviction under a plea of nolo contendere had been held
admissible to attack the credibility of a witness. In State v. Hcrlillyy
the defendant was indicted for keeping intoxicating liquors. At the trial,
evidence of a former conviction under a plea of nolo contendere was
introduced in order to impeach the credibility of the defendant who had
taken the stand in his own defense. Defendant's counsel urged that
evidence of his former conviction was not admissible since there had
been, under the nolo plea, no adjudication of his guilt. The Court
properly rejected this contention. A closely related problem was raised
in Comnzonwealth ex rel. District Attorney v. Jacksomus On a prior
occasion the defendant had pleaded nolo to an indictment charging
57. 102 'Ale. 310, 66 Ad. 643 (1906).
58. 248 Pa. 530, 94 AUt. 233 (1915). See also Commonwealth v. Horton, 26 Mass.
206 (1829); States v. Hartwvell, 26 Fed. Cas. 196, No. 15,318 (C. C. D. Mass. 1269) ;
United States cx reL. Bruno v. Reimer, 98 F. (2d) 92 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933); Barher v.
Almy, 20 R. I. 367, 39 At. 185 (1898). Contra: Doughty v. Amoreel, 22 R. I. 153,
46 At. 838 (1900).
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him with accepting bribes as a member of a school board. Quo warranto
proceedings were subsequently instituted under a statute providing for
removal of board members in the event of a conviction for accepting
bribes, and the Court upheld the petition.
As yet no court has considered the admissibility of evidence of a plea
of nolo in the situation presented in Myers v. United States." There
it was held that evidence of a plea of guilty in a state court to the
charge of possession of liquor was properly admissible in a criminal
prosecution in the federal court for the illegal sale of the liquor by the
same defendant. Despite absence of authority on the precise point, ad-
mission of evidence of a prior plea of nolo in this situation would also seem
unobjectionable. A similar issue arises in determining the effect of a
nolo plea to a federal anti-trust indictment in a subsequent state
criminal anti-trust action for the same offense. It is likely that a
defendant who has violated the federal anti-trust laws has by the same
acts violated the applicable state statute.10 In this situation, the nolo plea
would constitute a conviction in the same sense as a conviction after
a plea of guilty or after a verdict of guilty by a jury, and, therefore,
by analogy to the Myers case, be admissible as a confession or admission
in the state action."' On the other hand, if the action in the state court
were instituted under a state statute providing for forfeiture of the
corporate charter or the right to do business in the state by a foreign
or domestic corporation violating the state anti-trust law, then the action
would be a civil one and the defendant would not, in the absence of
statutory provisions to the contrary, be estopped from denying the facts
to which he had previously pleaded nolo in either the federal or state
courts. This common law proposition seems to have been given legis-
lative sanction in an amendment to the federal anti-trust laws,0 2 and,
59. 49 F. (2d) 230 (C. C. A. 4th, 1931), cert. denied, 283 U. S. 866 (1931).
60. In addition to the problem outlined above, a related problem arises where, as is
the case in a few states, the state antitrust laws provide that the corporate charter is to
be revoked where the corporation has twice been convicted of violating the state anti-
trust laws. In this connection, if either of the two convictions has been by way of a
plea of nolo contendere it would seem that the charter would be forfeited. Cf. People
v. Daiboch, 265 N. Y. 125, 191 N. E. 859 (1934).
61. A few jurisdictions that prohibit the use of the nolo plea will not recognize its
extraterritorial effect in a subsequent proceeding against the same defendant, See Peo-
ple v. Miller, 264 Ill. 148, 154, 106 N. E. 191, 194 (1914). (This case raises a conflict
of laws problem; it holds that since the plea of nolo contendere is not recognized in
Illinois, the admission in evidence of a prior conviction obtained under a plea of nolo
contendere is error). The New York rule is contra; in that jurisdiction the plea of
nolo contendere has also been outlawed. See People v. Daiboch, 265 N. Y. 125, 191 N. E.
859 (1934).
62. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 16 (1940): "A final judgment or decree
hereafter rendered in any criminal prosecution or in any suit or proceeding in equity
brought by or on behalf of the United States under the antitrust laws to the effect that
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as a result, a nolo plea has been held not to be prima facie evidence of
the defendant's guilt in a subsequent suit for statutory treble damages. C3
Congress in the Clayton Act" has given private persons, injured by
violations of the anti-trust laws,c5 the benefit of proceedings instituted
by the Government. In suing for statutory treble damages the injured
party may use a final judgment or decree in the Government's case as
prima facie evidence against the same defendants."0 In a leading case
involving this point, the intention to save the injured party the expense
and burden in litigation has been held not to apply to "consent judg-
ments or decrees entered before any testimony has been taken." And the
nolo plea was considered to be such a "consent judgment", so that it
was within the statutory immunity and not available to the damaged
party as prima face' evidence of the pleader's guilt."' In arriving at
its decision the court was undoubtedly influenced greatly by the language
of the statute - "before any testimony has been taken" -, for nolo
contendere can hardly be treated as a "consent judgment" in the man-
ner of a "consent decree" in a civil action. A "consent decree" in anti-
trust proceedings can only be entered with the consent of the govern-
ment, whereas a plea of nolo contendere can be accepted by the court
over the protestations of the prosecutor. Any characterization, therefore,
of nolo as a "consent judgment" must be considered "an anomaly in
legal parlance"." In the last analysis, the court simply gave expression
to congressional intent.
In view of the reported decisions, it would seem that, although some
courts make a subtle distinction between permitting the actual guilt
of the defendant to be shown after a nolo plea, and the fact of convic-
tion after such a plea, the defendant cannot escape the fact that there
has been conviction. Since a nolo plea is a conviction, it follows, then,
that one who has so pleaded, would make a material misrepresentation
a defendant has violated said laws shall be prima fade evidence against such defendant
in any suit or proceeding brought by any other party against such defendant under said
laws as to all matters respecting which said judgment or decree would be an estoppel as
between the parties thereto: Provided, This section shall not apply to consent judgments
or decrees entered before any testimony has been taken."
63. Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 26 F. Supp. 365, 376 (D. 11inn. 1939);
Barnsdall Refining Corp. v. Birnamwood Oil Co., 32 F. Supp. 30S, 311 (E. D. Wis.
1940).
64. 38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 12 (1940).
65. 26 STAT. 209 (1870), 15 U. S. C. § 1 (1940).
66. See note 59 supra.
67. Tvin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 26 F. Supp. 366, 376 (D. Minn. 1939).
68. See N. Y. Times, June 16, 1942, p. 30, col. 6, referring to United States v.
American Waxed Paper Ass'n (Crim. E. D. Pa., Jan. 7, 1942) in which one trade asso-
ciation, 34 member companies and seventy of their executives pleaded nolo and paid
$122,075 in fines, and reporting: "Judge Bard declared there was 'no such thing as a
consent judgment in a criminal proceeding' . .
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in answering in the negative, the question, "Have you ever been con-
victed of a crime?"
Many judges will not accept the plea of nolo contendere, basing their
refusal on the concededly logical premise that the accused is either guilty
or not guilty. But the reported decisions meet this argument by holding
that the fact of conviction is the same after a guilty plea as after a
plea of nolo contendere. Other judges object to the plea on the ground
that it is the result of a compromise between the prosecutor and the
defendant, a transaction to which the court would prefer not to be a
party. This argument is simply an emotional one, since such negotiations
cannot conclude the court O and there is nothing to prevent it from
imposing the maximum punishment covered by the statute after the
defendant has pleaded nolo.
The plea of nolo serves a practical function in the administration of
justice. There are many situations, of which anti-trust prosecution is
one, where the crime is considered nialun prohibitum rather than inaholu
in se,7" and in such situations the prosecutor is often inclined to agree
to the interposition of the nolo plea. This realistic policy dispenses
with lengthy and expensive trials. A law enforcement agency having
concurrent equitable and criminal power, like the Federal Anti-trust
Division, frequently follows an indictment with a civil complaint, thereby
seeking appropriate injunctive relief against the continuance of the
offense charged in the indictment. Thus, the closing out of criminal
cases by a nolo plea is simply preliminary to getting down to the job
of eradicating the improper practices. At the same time, the pleader
has paid his debt to society for past offenses and it can hardly be said
that in making a nolo plea the accused leaves the question of his guilt
undetermined.
69. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc., 23 F. Supp. 531, 532 (W. D.
Wis. 1938).
70. Ibid. In this anti-trust case the Court stated:
"This case, however, lies in a field where the Government might, with equal pro-
priety, have proceeded initially by a civil action in equity, or, as here, by a criminal
prosecution, either being an action to enforce penalties for the violation of a statute.
The Court is of the opinion that the wrong here coiniplained of is not malum in se, but
rather malum prohibitum, one peculiarly of an economic nature and one in which the
attainment of a proper understanding between the parties is of itself a desirable eod."
1268 [Vol, 51.: 1255
